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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a model that could be used 
by system developers to measure the privacy risk per- 
ceived by users when they disclose data into software 
systems. We first derive a model to measure the per- 
ceived privacy risk based on existing knowledge and 
then we test our model through a survey with 151 par- 
ticipants. Our findings revealed that users’ perceived 
privacy risk monotonically increases with data sensitiv- 
ity and visibility, and monotonically decreases with data 
relevance to the application. Furthermore, how visible 
data is in an application by default when the user dis- 
closes data had the highest impact on the perceived pri- 
vacy risk. This model would enable developers to mea- 
sure the users’ perceived privacy risk associated with 
data items, which would help them to understand how to 
treat different data within a system design. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The new European General Data Protection Regula- 
tions (GDPR) that came into effect in 2018 has gener- 
ated considerable interest towards privacy design guide- 
lines in software system designers, such as the Privacy 
by Design (PbD) principles [1]. However, PbD has been 
criticized for its limitations in being incompatible and 
different to the usual activities developers perform when 
they design software systems [2, 3]. One such limitation 
that has been frequently raised is its lack of support for 
developers to understand users’ perceived privacy risk 
when they design software systems [3]. Lack of under- 
standing on the privacy risk perceived by users could 
result in systems that do not cater for user privacy ex- 
pectations and hence invade user privacy when users in- 
teract with those systems [4]. That is, users perceive a 
privacy risk when they disclose data into software sys- 
tems, depending on the system they interact with and 
the data they are required to disclose [5]. However, 
heretofore developers are oblivion to this privacy risk 
users perceive [4, 6, 7].  If a system collects and stores 
data users perceive to have a higher privacy risk without 
anonymity or encryption, these data could be hacked and 
used by other parties, which could result in cyber bully- 
ing and identity theft. Because of this, software systems 
continue to fail user privacy even with the strict privacy 
regulations [1] and numerous privacy guidelines such as 
PbD that guide developers to embed privacy into soft- 
ware systems [4]. 
In this research we propose a model that would en- 
able software developers to understand the privacy risk 
users perceive when they disclose data into software sys- 
tems. Previous research has shown that the knowledge 
of the properties of data (such as how sensitive the con- 
tent is and how visible the content is in a system) could 
be used [8] to measure the privacy risk of content in 
software systems.  Consequently, it has been identified 
that this perceived privacy risk can be identified through 
the data disclosure decisions made by users [5]. For ex- 
ample, how sensitive data is, and how relevant data is 
to the application, are known to have an effect on the 
data disclosure decisions made by users [5]. This is be- 
cause users’ data disclosure decisions are closely related 
to their perceived privacy risk [9–11]. 
Building on this knowledge, we first measure users’ 
perceived privacy risk through their data disclosure de- 
cisions, and model the perceived privacy risk using the 
properties of the data such as data sensitivity and vis- 
ibility. Then, using a survey with 151 respondents we 
observe how good our model fits with the actual privacy 
risk perceived by users. Our findings disclosed that visi- 
bility of data has a significant impact on the privacy risk 
perceived by users. We also observed that the related- 
ness of data to the purpose of the application, has a neg- 
ative impact on the privacy risk perceived by users when 
they interact with systems. With these findings develop- 
ers can understand how they need to design systems to 
reduce the risk of data items within systems. This would 
eventually lead to systems that respect user privacy. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first discuss 
the background of perceived privacy risk, and privacy 
risk measurement to establish the grounds on which our 
work stand. Then, building on the existing theoretical 
knowledge on measuring privacy risk, we first logically 
build our model to measure users’ perceived privacy risk 
associated with disclosing data items in a given software 
system setting. Thereafter, we describe the experiment 
we conducted to measure the actual privacy risk per- 
ceived by users when they disclose their data. Next, we 
present our results where we show how good out model 
fits the observations, followed by a discussion of the ob- 
served variations and limitations of our model. Finally, 
we present our conclusions. 
 
2. Background 
 
Our focus in this research is to develop a metric 
to measure the users’ perceived privacy risk associated 
with data (such as their name, address and email ad- 
dress) in software systems (such as their banking app, 
their social networking account etc.). It has been iden- 
tified that understanding the data disclosure decisions 
made by users when interacting with software systems 
could help understanding their perceived privacy risk 
[9–11]. Nevertheless, among many research studies that 
attempts to interpret users privacy risk and their data dis- 
closure decisions [5, 10, 12–14], so far no attempt has 
been made to measure this privacy risk perceived by 
users when they disclose data into systems, in a com- 
prehensive way to software developers. 
Most research that observe disclosure decisions of 
users attempt to identify factors that could increase data 
disclosure. For example, focusing on the intrinsic prop- 
erties of the data being shared, Bansal et al. have shown 
that users’ intention to disclose health information is af- 
fected by the sensitivity of the data [15]. This intrigued 
our interest. Malhotra et al. have also shown that con- 
sumer willingness to share personal data in commercial 
platforms is affected by the sensitivity of the data [11]. 
Similarly, Malheiros et al. [5] have shown that sensitiv- 
ity of data items such as date of birth and occupation 
had a significant affect on the decisions of the users to 
disclose that data into software systems. However, how 
these parameters correlate when users make their deci- 
sions to disclose data and how software developers could 
make use of this information when they design software 
systems are not yet known. 
Consequently, it is said that users are more likely to 
disclose data when they are shown the decisions made 
by their friends [14] or other users [16]. Similarly, Ac- 
quisti et al. found that changing the order of intru- 
siveness of the data being requested also makes users 
disclose more data when interacting with software sys- 
tems [17]. Furthermore, testing the effect of the jus- 
tification provided by the system when requesting data 
Knijnenburg and Kobsa [18] revealed that when users 
are told this data is useful for you users are more likely 
to disclose data to the application.  Nevertheless, these 
research focus either on the features of the system that 
requests data [5, 10, 13] or the personality of the user 
who discloses data [19] and attempt to find ways to in- 
crease user data disclosure [14]. We approach this prob- 
lem from a different standpoint. We believe that rather 
than finding ways to increase data disclosure, developers 
should implement better privacy in systems and trans- 
parently communicate with users so that the cumulative 
privacy risk in systems would be reduced. For this de- 
velopers should be able to measure and understand the 
privacy risk perceived by users when they disclose data. 
From a perspective of privacy risk measurement, 
Maximilien et al. [8] have shown that a metric for pri- 
vacy risk in a given context can be obtained by mul- 
tiplying the measurement for sensitivity of a data item 
with the measurement for visibility the data item gets 
in an application. They define their metric for privacy 
risk as “a measurement that determines their [the user’s] 
willingness to disclose information associated with this 
item” [8]. Using this metric, Minkus and Memon [20] 
have attempted to measure the privateness of Facebook 
users from their privacy settings. However, privacy risk 
is a contextual measurement. The context in which data 
is being disclosed [19, 21] is known to have an effect 
on user disclosure decisions [5, 12]. For example, it is 
said that users have a negative attitude towards rewards 
for data disclosure when the requested data appears ir- 
relevant for a system [10], whereas they accepted the 
rewards if the data is relevant for the system. However, 
the current model by Maximilien et al. [8] for privacy 
risk measurement of content, does not account for the 
relatedness of data. Nevertheless, when a developer at- 
tempts to make use of the perceived privacy risk of data 
to support him in the decisions to embed privacy into 
the system (for example embedding data minimization 
into a software system), how relevant the data is to the 
system is important [6]. The requirements established 
by the recent reforms in the GDPR to collect only rel- 
evant data, and communicate the use of data to system 
users [1] exacerbates the importance of developers ac- 
counting for data relatedness when designing privacy- 
respectful software systems. 
In this research, we focus on the effect of data sensi- 
tivity, the relevance of the data for an application and the 
visibility the data gets in the application on the privacy 
risk perceived by users. With this we propose a model 
that could communicate the effect of data sensitivity, 
visibility and the relatedness of data for a particular ap- 
plication on the privacy risk perceived by users to soft- 
ware developers and privacy researchers.  By software 
developers, we refer to all those who are involved in 
making the decisions on collecting data, designing and 
implementing software systems. The proposed model 
would help them to understand and incorporate privacy 
risk perceived by users into the software system designs 
and assist the development of privacy respectful soft- 
ware systems. 
 
3. Study Design 
 
In this section we first introduce the parameters of 
data we are interested in. Then using these parameters 
we derive and propose a model to measure privacy risk 
of data items based on existing theoretical knowledge. 
The goal of our research was to develop a measure- 
ment to calculate the privacy risk perceived by users 
when they disclose data into software systems. Refer- 
ring to previous research we identified data sensitivity 
(S), relatedness (R) and visibility (V) of data has an im- 
pact on the privacy risk that is perceived by users when 
they make data disclosure decisions. For the context of 
this research we define data sensitivity, visibility and re- 
latedness of data to be parameters that depend only on 
the data item Di and the application context in which it 
is being accessed/used Cj . Following subsections define 
the parameters for the context of the model we propose. 
 
3.1. Data Sensitivity 
 
We define the sensitivity of a particular data item to 
be a parameter that is dependent on the data item Di 
itself. That is credit card number is inherently more sen- 
sitive for a user than their age. We define sensitivity of a 
data item to be the perceived impact of loss of that par- 
ticular data item. We define sensitivity in three categor- 
ical values based on logical reasoning and the definition 
of sensitive data in the European Data Protection Reg- 
ulations (GDPR) [1]. Three categories are considered 
to be cognitively more manageable than complex scales 
with more levels of categorization [7]. Our definitions 
for categorization is given in table 1. 
 
3.2. Data Visibility (V) 
 
We define the visibility of a data element to be an in- 
herent property gained by a particular data element Di in 
a particular application context Cj due to the design of 
the application. That is how visible the data item would 
be by default once the user disclose the data item to the 
application. If the application by default allows the data 
to be seen only by the user, we define that data item 
has the lowest visibility. These categories are defined 
on the basis of the survey conducted by Minkus and 
Table 1.   Data Sensitivity (S) 
 
Category Description S 
Category I 
-   Highest 
sensitivity 
Data that could be used to identify a 
unique characteristic of a person. For 
example, a person’s race, religion or 
HIV status. 
3 
Category 
II  -  Mod- 
erate 
sensitivity 
Personally   Identifiable   information 
about   the   person.      For   example, 
a person’s name, address, mobile 
number. 
2 
Category 
III  -  Low 
sensitivity 
Any other detail about a person that 
may have an impact of loss, however, 
would not affect the person. For exam- 
ple, a person’s high school. 
1 
 
 
Memon [20]. In their attempts to scale Facebook privacy 
settings according to their visibility, they have asked par- 
ticipants questions that investigate the users’ perception 
of visibility of their content in Facebook. Building on 
their reasoning we logically form the three visibility cat- 
egories presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2.   Data Visibility 
 
Category Description V 
Category I 
-   Highest 
visibility 
Data would be seen by any one by de- 
fault. Data is visible in the application 
by default. For example the name of a 
user in Facebook. 
3 
Category 
II  -  Mod- 
erate 
visibility 
Data would be seen by a controlled set 
of users by default. For example, con- 
tent that can be only see by the friends 
of the user in Facebook. 
2 
Category 
III  -  Low 
visibility 
Data would be seen by any one by de- 
fault. Data is visible in the application 
by default. For example, your pin num- 
ber in the banking app will not be visi- 
ble to any one. 
1 
 
 
3.3. Data Relatedness (R) 
 
We define the relatedness of a data element Di to 
be a property that is defined by the application context 
Cj . That is based on the requirements of the applica- 
tion, the data could be highly related to the application 
(for example, your bank account number for your bank- 
ing application) or not related at all. This is determined 
by the primary functionality of the application defined 
by the application requirements. We build this catego- 
rization based on logical reasoning. While it has been 
widely accepted that the relatedness of data affects the 
privacy risk perceived by users when they disclose data 
into software systems [19, 21], so far there is no evi- 
dence as to how related a data item should be in order 
to make users feel comfortable sharing those data into 
 
Sa b 
the system.  Therefore, based on logical reasoning, we 
propose the categorization present in table 3 for scaling 
Privacy Risk P(i,j) = 
i × V(i,j) 
 
 
c 
(i,j) 
data relatedness to a software system. 
 
 
Table 3.   Data Relatedness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to our definitions presented in tables 1-3, the 
relatedness of a data element Di in an application con- 
text Cj also takes categorical values Ri,j ∈ {1,2,3}, vis- 
ibility of a data element Di in an application context Cj 
takes categorical values Vi,j ∈ {1,2,3} and the sensitiv- 
ity of a data element Di takes categorical values Si ∈ 
{1,2,3}. 
 
3.4. A Model to calculate privacy risk of data 
elements : 
 
In order to model users’ perceived privacy risk, we 
define the calculated privacy risk Pi,j of a data element 
Di in an application context Cj as follows. Building up 
on the relationship proposed by Maximilien et al. [8] we 
define that the privacy risk Pi,j of a data element Di in 
an application context Cj monotonically increases with 
the sensitivity of a data item Si and the visibility of a 
data item in a given context V(i,j). This has been previ- 
ously used by Minkus and Memon [20] in determining 
the privacy level of Facebook privacy settings for a par- 
ticular user. Then, we propose that the privacy risk Pc 
of a data element Di in an application context Cj is in 
a monotonically decremental relationship with the relat- 
edness of the data element Di to the application context 
Cj . This is based on the knowledge that users perceive 
low privacy risk when disclosing data items that are rel- 
evant to the application as opposed to data elements that 
do not appear relevant [18]. Therefore, we propose that 
an approximation for the privacy risk Pi,j of a data el- 
ement Di in an application context Cj can be obtained 
by, 
where a,b and c values could take any real number. 
However, as we are aiming for an approximation we 
limit a,b,c to whole numbers. 
According to this calculation Privacy Risk P(i,j) of a 
data element Di in an application context Cj ∈ {x| x in 
IR where, 0 < x}. Next, in order to see how closely the 
proposed model fit the actual privacy risk perceived by 
the users when they disclose data we conducted a survey 
study. 
 
4. Research Study 
 
Our goal in conducting the research study is to ob- 
serve how close the relationship we proposed using data 
sensitivity, visibility and relatedness approximate the ac- 
tual privacy risk perceived by users. Building on the 
work of Maximilien et al. [8] we define perceived pri- 
vacy risk Pi,j to be “a measurement that determines the 
user’s feeling of discomfort in disclosing an data item 
Di in an application context Cj ”. We conducted two 
separate user studies for this research. 
 
4.1. Study I : 
 
The first study was an online survey with 151 inter- 
net users to obtain the dependent variable of our model, 
the privacy risk perceived by users Pi,j . Users’ per- 
ceived privacy risk can be interpreted as their discom- 
fort or reluctance for data disclosure in software sys- 
tems [9–11]. Therefore, in the user survey we obtained 
the discomfort of users when they disclose data into soft- 
ware systems Fd as a measurement of their perceived 
privacy risk Pi,j . For this we defined three data disclo- 
sure scenarios. 
• Health-care application that allows remote con- 
sultancy with doctors - with data being visible to 
the user and the doctor. 
• Social Networking application - with no control 
over data visibility (Cannot control who can view 
the data once disclosed). 
• Banking application - with the data being visible 
only to the user (and the bank). 
We defined these scenarios with three different visi- 
bility levels based on our definitions in table 2. We used 
ten data items including demographic data and sensi- 
tive data following the GDPR [1]. The data items we 
provided are name, age, address, mobile number, email 
R 
Category Description R 
Category I 
-   Highest 
relatedness 
Data the application cannot do without. 
These data are absolutely necessary for 
the primary functionality of the appli- 
cation. 
3 
Category 
II  -  Mod- 
erate 
relatedness 
Data could add additional functionality 
to the application. For example, data 
that could deliver benefits through data 
analysis techniques. 
2 
Category 
III  -  Low 
relatedness 
Data the application can do without. 
For example, data that is not needed for 
the functionality of the application. 
1 
 
address, occupation, blood type, credit card number, 
medicine taken, and birthday. We asked the participants 
how they would feel if they are to disclose these 10 data 
items in the four application contexts. We define a five 
point Likert scale to express their feeling of disclosure 
Fd, with values, very uncomfortable, somewhat uncom- 
fortable, neutral, somewhat comfortable and very com- 
fortable. We alternatively used reverse ordered Likert 
scales to ensure the validity of the answers. We consider 
Fd to be a function of the sensitivity of the data item i 
(Si), visibility of the data item in the application j (Vi,j ) 
and the relatedness of the data item to the context of the 
software system j (Ri,j ). Our goal is to determine how 
close the calculated privacy risk from the model we pro- 
posed Pi,j  would approximate Fd. 
In the survey we also included an open ended ques- 
tion in the questionnaire to further observe the reasons 
for the difference in the feeling of discomfort (Fd) users 
expressed. With this we aimed to obtain further insights 
as to why users demonstrate different discomfort levels 
when they disclose different data items into different ap- 
plication contexts. At the end of the survey, we included 
questions to extract the demographics of the participants 
which is presented in table 4. 
 
Table 4.   Participants (151) 
 
Gender No. of Participants 
Male 87 
Female 64 
Education 
Completed School Education 5 
Professional Diploma 9 
Bachelor’s Degree 87 
Masters/PhD 50 
Age 
18-24 31 
25-32 101 
33-40 13 
41 or above 6 
 
The survey design was evaluated with two partici- 
pants (graduate students in the university not connected 
to the research). We fine tuned the wording of the ques- 
tionnaire with the feedback of these two participants. 
Then the survey was distributed using social media plat- 
forms (Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter) and personal 
connections of the authors. The research methodology 
(survey design, participant recruitment and results col- 
lection) was approved by the university ethic committee 
responsible for ethical conduction of studies that involve 
human subjects. 
In the invitation email we sent to participants, we in- 
cluded a brief introduction about the survey and the du- 
ration of the survey (under 10 minutes, calculated using 
the participants who evaluated the questionnaire). We 
provided the participants with the contact details of the 
researchers in case they wanted to contact us for more 
information. Before proceeding with the survey partici- 
pants were given an introduction to the survey with de- 
tails about the survey and the type of data we collect. 
We also informed the participants that they could exit 
the survey at any time without submitting their answers. 
Participants were asked to proceed with the survey if 
they give us (the researchers) consent to collect and store 
the details they submit with the survey. 
We measured the participant adequacy while collect- 
ing data and stopped data collection when we reached 
sample adequacy at KMO = 0.8 (A KMO value 0.8 is 
considered good in calculating correlations [22]). We 
had 157 responses at that point. We then analyzed the 
data and eliminated 6 responses that were either incom- 
plete or invalid as the participant had selected the same 
choice in the Likert scale for all options. 
To transform the likert scale input into a measure- 
ment of the feeling of discomfort of the participants, we 
assigned values from 1 to 5 for the answers we received 
on the Likert scale as follows. Very Comfortable (1), 
Somewhat Comfortable (2), Neutral (3), Somewhat Un- 
comfortable (4), Very Uncomfortable (5). Through this 
we obtained Fd ∈ {1,2,3,4,5} of users for the 30 sce- 
narios (ten data items in three application contexts) that 
represent the user’s feeling of discomfort in disclosing 
data. 
 
4.2. Study II : 
 
The second study was a focus group with 4 soft- 
ware developers, to obtain the independent variables of 
the model (sensitivity, visibility and relatedness) for the 
three data disclosure scenarios we used in the survey. 
As our goal is to introduce a metric for software devel- 
opers to evaluate the privacy risk perceived by users, we 
calculated P(i,j) through a focus group with 4 partic- 
ipants with software development experience. We be- 
lieve this approach would closely represent the context 
in which software developers would discuss and evalu- 
ate the sensitivity, visibility and the relatedness of the 
data elements they use in software systems, at design 
stage. The focus group took 40 minutes and the partici- 
pants were volunteers. 
In the focus group we first discussed the data items 
as individual elements and categorize them according to 
sensitivity. For this we provided the participants with 
the three categorical definitions we defined in table 1. 
Next, for all three application scenarios, we asked the 
developers to categorize the ten data items according 
to their relatedness to the application context and pro- 
vided them with table 3. We encouraged the partici- 
pants to raise arguments and discuss and clarify differ- 
ent opinions in categorizing data. As visibility was pre- 
determined when we defined the three application sce- 
narios in the survey and communicated to users in the 
user study we did not evaluate it here. During the focus 
group, we also evaluated our model for data categoriza- 
tion presented in Table 1, 2 and 3. We encouraged the 
participants to argue and raise any concerns they had on 
the three categories we defined and their appropriateness 
in categorizing the data. We discuss the concerns raised 
by the participants in the focus group when we discuss 
our findings. 
 
 
 
4.2.1. Data Analysis After obtaining the S,V,R 
combinations for the 30 scenarios from the focus group, 
we tested the calculated perceived privacy risk using our 
model against the perceived privacy risk values we ob- 
tained through the user study. We first attempted to fit 
our model on the raw data available (151 users and 30 in- 
stances, altogether 4530 instances). However, due to the 
relatively high variation of data, it was not possible to fit 
a model to the data set. That is, the same combination of 
S,V, R values had multiple perceived privacy risks vary- 
ing from 1 to 5. This is expected because users have 
very different perceived privacy risks. We then averaged 
the perceived privacy risk of all 151 users to obtain 30 
distinct mean perceived privacy risk values for the 30 
scenarios tested. Then we used these values to observe 
the goodness of fit of our proposed model in Matlab. 
We used qualitative methods to analyse the an- 
swers to the open ended question using two indepen- 
dent coders. We followed the grounded theory approach 
where the coders coded data by eliciting codes from the 
data available without any prejudice [23]. This was done 
in NVivo [24]. Coders reached code saturation at 49 and 
103 respectively. The two coders came up with 6 com- 
mon codes and 7 and 20 codes present in either of the 
coders at the end. This was because one coder had very 
granular level codes while the other coder had coded 
data at a higher level. For example, one coder had a code 
saying visibility of data, while the other coder had three 
separate codes for the same content as controlling who 
can see my data, application providing tools to hide data 
from public and controlling data in the app. Then both 
coders iteratively evaluated their codes and merged sim- 
ilar codes together to come up with 11 final codes that 
explain the differences in the privacy risks perceived by 
the participants. 
5. Results 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Feeling of Discomfort in Disclosure - 
Health application 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Feeling of Discomfort in Disclosure - 
Social Networking application 
 
 
We tested the validity of our results with Cronbach’s 
alpha (0.91) (a Cronbach’s alpha > 0.7 is considered ac- 
ceptable [25]) and the participant adequacy for correla- 
tions with KMO (KMO = 0.8269). The charts (figures 
1-3) shows the averages of the disclosure feeling of the 
151 participants on the 10 data items across the three 
scenarios. It can be seen that in all scenarios except for 
the banking app users had the highest discomfort in shar- 
ing their credit card information, and this was followed 
by medical information except for the medical applica- 
tion, which suggests users feel higher risk when disclos- 
ing sensitive data yet, it was reduced when they felt that 
the data was related to the application. 
 
 
 
Table 5.   Model Fitting - basic model 
Model a (95% CI) 
Goodness of fit 
SSE R2 RMSE 
S1 1 
i ×V(i,j) 
R1 
(i,j) 
0.24 67.8 0.6 1.5 
 
  
Figure 3.  Feeling of Discomfort in Disclosure - 
Banking application 
 
 
Table 6.   Model Fitting 
Tables 5-7 shows the results when our model for cal- 
culated privacy risk P(i,j) was tested against the per- 
ceived privacy risk Fd. In these tables SSE : Sum of 
Squares due to Error, R2 : Square of the correlation 
between the calculated Pi,j and the observed Pi,j , and 
RMSE : Root Mean Squared Error. Table 5 shows that 
when we give the same power to all three parameters in 
the relationship the error is relatively high with a low 
R-square value. In table 6, we tried all 27 combinations 
of the powers 1,2 and 3 for S,V,R combinations without 
the combinations where all parameters have the same 
power. That is we ignored the combinations (1,1,1), 
(2,2,2) and (3,3,3). Table 6 shows that the goodness of 
fit increases with the increase of the power of visibility 
and decreases when the power of sensitivity and relat- 
edness increases. Therefore, in table 8 we gradually in- 
creased the power of visibility and tested the goodness 
of fit while keeping the power of sensitivity and related- 
ness at 1. 
 
Table 7.    Model Fitting - increasing visibility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can see that the error increases again the power 
of visibility increases beyond 7. Therefore, the optimal 
relationship with the best goodness of fit is in the model 
where visibility is raised to the power of 7 with a co- 
2 
efficient of 0.01.  This had a SSE of  7.6 and an R   of 
71.5%. However the increase of R2 from the model with 
visibility to the power three to visibility to the power 7 
is only almost 1%. Therefore, one could safely assume 
that the model, 
 
 
0.03 × Si 3 (i,j) 
 
 
R(i,j) 
 
gives a good enough approximation of the privacy 
risk perceived by users for a data item i in a software 
application j. From the results, it is apparent that the 
visibility has the largest effect on the perceived privacy 
risk. In order to further observe why users felt differ- 
ently when they disclosed data in the three scenarios we 
 
 
Model a (95% CI) 
Goodness of fit 
SSE R2 RMSE 
S1 ×V 4 
a( i     (i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
0.01 7.872 0.7079 0.5302 
S1 ×V 5 
a( i     (i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
0.003 7.723 0.7134 0.5252 
S1 ×V 6 
a( i     (i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
0.001 7.682 0.7149 0.5238 
S1 ×V 7 
a( i     (i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
0.01 7.682 0.715 0.5238 
S1 ×V 8 
a( i     (i,j) ) R1 (i,j) 
0.01 7.693 0.7145 0.5242 
S1 ×V 9 
a( i     (i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
4.378e-05 7.706 0.7141 0.5246 
 
× V 
Model a (95% CI) 
Goodness of fit 
SSE R2 RMSE 
S1 1 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R2 
(i,j) 
0.24 15.22 0.4353 0.7373 
S1 1 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R3 
(i,j) 
0.21 16.7 0.3803 0.7723 
S1 2 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
0.10 9.335 0.6536 0.5774 
S1 2 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R2 (i,j) 
0.08 12.57 0.5336 0.67 
S1 2 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R3 
(i,j) 
0.08 14.4 0.4657 0.7171 
S1 3 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
0.03 8.285 0.6926 0.544 
S1 3 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R2 
(i,j) 
0.03 11.73 0.5646 0.5646 
S1 3 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R3 
(i,j) 
0.02 13.71 0.4912 0.6998 
S2 1 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R1 (i,j) 
0.08 13.94 0.4828 0.7055 
S2 1 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R2 
(i,j) 
0.07 15.38 0.4294 0.7411 
S2 1 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R3 
(i,j) 
0.07 16.45 0.3895 0.7666 
S2 2 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
0.03 11.06 0.5897 0.6284 
S2 2 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R3 
(i,j) 
0.02 14.78 0.4515 0.7266 
S2 3 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R1 (i,j) 
0.01 10.07 0.6264 0.5996 
2 3 
a( 
Si ×V(i,j) ) R2 
(i,j) 
0.009 12.74 0.5271 0.6746 
S2 3 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R3 
(i,j) 
0.009 14.38 0.4665 0.7166 
3 1 
a( 
Si ×V(i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
0.02 14.37 0.4669 0.7163 
S3 1 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R2 
(i,j) 
0.02 15.31 0.432 0.7394 
S3 1 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R3 (i,j) 
0.02 16.22 0.3982 0.7611 
S3 2 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R1 
(i,j) 
0.009 11.68 0.5664 0.646 
3 2 
a( 
Si ×V(i,j) ) R2 
(i,j) 
0.009 13.56 0.497 0.6958 
S3 2 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R3 
(i,j) 
0.008 14.86 0.4485 0.7286 
3 3 
a( 
Si ×V(i,j) ) R1 (i,j) 
0.003 10.78 0.5998 0.6206 
S3 3 
a( i 
×V(i,j) ) R2 (i,j) 
0.003 13.12 0.513 0.6846 
 
used in the study, we present the qualitative analysis of 
the reasons users gave. 
 
5.1. Qualitative Analysis 
 
Table 8 summarizes the codes we generated through 
the qualitative analysis. When it comes to the prop- 
erties of data, participants mentioned that sensitivity, 
relevance and visibility of the data items affected their 
disclosure decisions. However, from their answers we 
could not identify any other attribute related to the data 
itself that affected the privacy risk perceived by users 
when they disclosed data. Participants mostly men- 
tioned relevance of data (26%) followed by sensitivity of 
data (15%) and data visibility (12%). Nevertheless, our 
model showed that the visibility of data had the highest 
impact on the privacy risk perceived by users. Concern- 
ing visibility, participants said If the application pro- 
vides some tools to hide private information from pub- 
lic, it is fine and the controls on the data we disclosed 
are important. 
Consequently, we identified that users are concerned 
about the trust towards the organization that develop 
and publish applications (19%). Participants said that 
they are comfortable sharing data as long as the applica- 
tion is developed and owned by a trusted organization. 
This explains the relatively low mean perceived privacy 
risk we observed for the banking app, probably because 
users trusted their bank more. When it comes to trust, 
some participants spoke about the trust with the appli- 
cation itself rather than the organization (11%). Inter- 
estingly, participants said that they build trust based on 
common sense, Thats due to the feeling of trust I have 
with them. i’m aware i should read information disclo- 
sure agreement. But I’m not reading it most of the time 
and use common sense. This is an interesting finding 
that could be investigated further to see how users build 
trust with applications without reading the privacy pol- 
icy. Some participants also raised concerns about per- 
sonal safety (12%). Their concerns on personal safety 
was two fold.  One, financial and reputation loss when 
data is accessed by unknown parties and two, being sub- 
jected to unwanted marketing via phone and email. They 
said they consider being exposed to unwanted advertis- 
ing as a personal threat. A small number of participants 
mentioned their personal experience, the news they hear 
and also the benefits they could gain through data dis- 
closure. 
6. Discussion 
 
The model we propose in this research is derived 
based on the theoretical knowledge presented by Max- 
imilien et al. [8]. They propose that privacy risk could 
be measured by sensitivity (S) and visibility (V) where 
S and V are in any arbitrary relationship that results in a 
monotonically incremental result for privacy risk. How- 
ever, their model has been applied on the assumption 
that both S and V of content has the same effect on the 
privacy risk [20]. Consequently, their model does not 
account for the relatedness of content. In our model we 
introduced a term for relatedness (R) of the content and 
through a user study we were able to identify that V had 
more impact on the privacy risk of the content than S 
and R. Our model shows that content visibility should 
be considered at a higher power to closely approximate 
the perceived privacy risk. This suggests that develop- 
ers could significantly reduce the privacy risk perceived 
by users by controlling the visibility of their data within 
the system. That is in a system design, after measur- 
ing the privacy risk perceived by users against the data 
that is used in the system, developers could reduce the 
visibility of data with high privacy risk. When data is 
less visible in a system, the risk associated with those 
data reduces. This principle is also coined by unobserv- 
ability and undetectability. Thereby suggesting that this 
would also reduce the actual privacy risk of data items 
in the system. Our model also shows that the R of data 
is in a monotonically decreasing relationship with users’ 
perceived privacy. This suggest that developers should 
focus on using data that is absolutely necessary (higher 
relatedness) for the applications. Data privacy regula- 
tions such as the GDPR also emphasize this need [1]. 
Therefore, though reducing the perceived privacy risk of 
data, system developers can also reduce the actual pri- 
vacy risk of data within their system designs. 
For the categorization of data according to S, V and 
R we used three categories. In the workshop to deter- 
mine S,V and R values with software developers, we 
encouraged the developers to further define categories 
if they felt three categories were not sufficient to han- 
dle the variations in S, V and R of data. We also asked 
them to challenge and argue on the definitions we have 
provided. While the participants agreed with three cat- 
egories for V and R, they said that S may require more 
categories to identify sensitive data and extremely sen- 
sitive data. However, when they created one more cate- 
gory for extremely sensitive data, they ended up moving 
all data in the sensitive category to the extremely sensi- 
tive category and hence ending up with three categories 
at the end. Therefore, the participants agreed that the 
three categories we defined sufficiently captures the S,V 
R variation in data. 
Our model provides developers with a measurable 
approach to understand users’ perceived privacy risk. 
While previous research has always highlighted the need 
for software developers to understand and acknowledge 
Table 8.   Issues participants faced when embedding privacy into the designs 
 
Code Representative Quotes Coverage 
Benefit to me how it benefits myself/ how useful it is for me. 2.64% (4) 
How much I need the app based on my requirements from the application 7.2%(11) 
News I see by considering cyber crimes and all that 0.66%(1) 
Personal experience I was in couple of these situations which gave me an idea 2%(3) 
Personal Safety Some data could cause reputation and/or financial loss 12% (19) 
Relevance of data if I don’t think such applications needs the data 26% (40) 
Visibility of Data whether I could control what others see 12% (19) 
Sensitivity of Data some sensitive information can’t be disclosed irrespective of the application 15% (23) 
Transparency Depends on what they are going to do with the information 6.6% (10) 
Trusting the application every online application cannot be trusted 11% (17) 
Trusting the organization If it is a reputed or a government institution there is less doubt and more trust 19% (29) 
 
 
user privacy requirements [3, 6], involvement of actual 
users in the system design process is not considered 
practical due to higher costs and time constrains [2]. Our 
model provides a cost effective alternative for develop- 
ers to approximate the privacy risk perceived by users 
when they design software systems. Furthermore, com- 
pared to the soft measurements developers are expected 
to make in most scenarios that involve user privacy, we 
argue that this model to measure users’ perceived pri- 
vacy risk would be meaningful and pragmatic. For ex- 
ample, it has been previously coined that when imple- 
menting privacy in software systems, developers find 
it difficult to interpret the requirements to anonymize 
appropriate data, encrypt sensitive data, when they are 
required to make soft decisions which are not measur- 
able [4]. The proposed model would help developers 
to understand data and the perceived privacy risk asso- 
ciated with data [26]. This knowledge could be used 
within existing privacy guidelines, to measure the pri- 
vacy risk of data. Thereby identifying data considered as 
high risk and implement techniques in system designs to 
protect data. However, we do not go to the extent of arbi- 
trarily proposing ways to use the model proposed here. 
Rather, we suggest that privacy engineers and system 
developers could utilize the knowledge presented in this 
paper to implement and protect user data in system de- 
signs, paving the way for designing privacy aware soft- 
ware systems. 
Consequently, the model we derived here does not 
account for the human attributes of users that affect 
their perceived privacy risk when interacting with soft- 
ware systems. Previous research has shown that the per- 
sonality of users affects the privacy risk they perceive 
when they interact with software systems. For exam- 
ple, Westin’s privacy personality scale [27] shows that 
users could be divided into privacy fundamentalists (ex- 
tremely concerned about privacy), privacy pragmatists 
(believe that privacy needs to be compromised according 
 
to situations) and privacy unconcerned, (little or no con- 
cern about privacy) [27]. Indicating the effect of such 
personalities, in our survey one participant said Basi- 
cally I feel comfortable giving information on a need to 
know basis only and another one said nothing implying 
he did not feel different disclosing data into different ap- 
plication settings. This could be explained by the theory 
of psychometry, which explains why people’s percep- 
tion of external factors such as privacy is dependent on 
their psychological differences [11, 28]. There is a lot 
of work done in this area where privacy psychometry 
is scaled and defined. For example IUIPC is one such 
scale that defines how people differ in their privacy atti- 
tudes [11]. These scales suggest that attributes such as 
previous experience and the nature of work they do that 
may affect users’ perceived privacy risk. For example, 
P5 said With the experiences when surfing in the inter- 
net made me to answer above questions so and P89 said 
I was in couple of these situations which gave me an 
idea to answer these questions easily. However, in this 
research our focus was to model the perceived privacy 
risk eliminating the personality traits of a person. There- 
fore, by design our survey did not capture the privacy 
profile of our participants. The model we tested had an 
SSE value of 7.682 and an R2 value of 71%, which is 
an acceptable goodness of fit in a human study. While 
the variations in the model could probably be explained 
by human factors, for the purpose of deriving a model 
for software developers to approximate the privacy risk 
users perceive related to the data used in software sys- 
tems, our model is appropriate. As future work, we aim 
to improve our study with privacy profiling of partici- 
pants incorporating the models that capture psychome- 
tric measurements [11, 27, 28], in order to observe how 
our model could cater for users with different privacy 
personalities. 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this research we used the sensitivity of data, the 
visibility data gets in a system design and the related- 
ness of data to the system as the independent variables 
and proposed a model to measure users’ perceived pri- 
vacy risk based on existing theoretical knowledge. We 
then tested our model against the privacy risk perceived 
by users in three different application settings. Our re- 
sults indicate that both sensitivity and visibility of con- 
tent must be in a monotonically increasing combination 
to represent the perceived privacy risks. At the same 
time relatedness of the content should be in a combina- 
tion with sensitivity and visibility such that privacy risk 
monotonically decrease with the relatedness. The model 
shows that content visibility has the highest impact on 
the perceived privacy risk of users. 
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